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 Thoughts on Reading "the Personal":
 Toward a Discursive Ethics of
 Professional Critical Literacy
 Jane E. Hindman
 It makes little sense to see the expressivist move to the personal as emerging from an inordinate
 confidence in the capacity of individuals to apprehend untainted truth; the move is prompted
 [. .] by conditions of language and its users.
 -Thomas G. O'Donnell, "Politics and Ordinary Language" 432
 am grateful for the opportunity to put together this special issue. I've discov-
 ered that, much like my work in the classroom, editing teaches me as much as
 if not more than it does the others who sign up for my purported expertise.
 From selecting the manuscripts, to deciding which reviews to privilege, to
 recommending revisions, and finally to constructing what I want to say here, this
 process has enriched and refined my understanding of personal writing and its con-
 tributions to scholarly work.
 For instance, after reading through all the thirty submissions-even some of
 the ones that you'll read here-I noted discrepancies between what I and others
 seem to expect from effective personal writing for scholarly publication. Some writ-
 ers apparently believe that being asked to write the personal-whether it be a narra-
 tive, experiential, affective, and/or embodied piece-frees them from the constraints
 of writing for readers. As a result, some ignore what I consider necessities, for in-
 stance, if not a "thesis," at least a predominant (if not explicitly stated) point as well
 as a cogent and coherent arrangement of text, even if that text consists of frag-
 mented reflections on a unifying concept. Some scholars-and not just those who
 submitted manuscripts for this issue-seem to think that personal writing frees them
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 from the demands of professional academic writing, demands such as making new
 knowledge of relevance to English studies communities and/or applying existing
 knowledge(s) and/or theorizing rather than simply relating personal knowledge,
 regardless of how clever the description.
 What I think of as personal writing for an academic audience is simply not that
 "free." College English readers in particular, steeped in great literature and/or effec-
 tive rhetoric and expert at evaluating others' essays, may become more impatient
 with wordy, unfocused, mundane, or irrelevant personal accounts than with aca-
 demic ones. In addition, regardless of their genre, personal writers must at least
 consider the focused concerns of College English referees' traditional concerns (ar-
 ticulated on the standard referee questionnaire), such as whether or not the subject
 will be of general interest to readers of College English, whether previous and current
 scholarship on the topic is acknowledged, how likely other authors might be to cite
 the submission, and how readily nonspecialists will understand the article. In other
 words, like all professional writing, and as my opening reference to O'Donnell's
 "Politics and Ordinary Language" explains, personal writing must be shaped by "the
 conditions of language and its users"; it cannot be properly "placed" in the academic
 unless it's social, that is, constructed for readers in the context in which it is to be
 received. Referees' rejections of much of my own personal writing have sufficiently
 persuaded me of that fact.
 Another point about what I learned as I read submissions for this issue: I prefer
 personal writing that's "personal," that stages the author grappling with his or her
 own self-construction(s). Many others-Min-Zhan Lu comes most readily to mind-
 attend to our "need to imagine ways of using experience critically" ("Reading" 2 39)
 as we instruct students how to write their difference and learn ourselves how to read
 through our own difference and evaluate their work justly, effectively. I, however,
 am concerned with how to attend to that need in our own scholarly writing as well as
 in our positions as readers of our colleagues'.
 As a result, this issue focuses primarily on embodied personal writing, a schol-
 arly concern of mine for quite some time now. In efforts to identify and argue for a
 powerful alternative to masculinist discourse, my specific call has been to incorpo-
 rate an "embodied rhetoric" into our professional discursive practices. Generally
 speaking, embodied rhetoric "requires gestures to the material practices of the pro-
 fessional group and to the quotidian circumstances of the individual writer," such as
 the writer's affect, motive(s), history, and/or stakes in the argument or position adopted
 ("Writing" 103). These unfamiliar, "personal" gestures replace or supplement con-
 ventional gestures to an always-already-constituted disciplinary authority, familiar
 moves such as citing a rigidly surveilled and highly specialized body of disciplinary
 knowledge; resolving contradictions within or between disciplinary positions; de-
 termining the nature and/or tradition of a discipline and whom it should include; or
 applying or testing a disciplinary theory.
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 My call for a more embodied scholarly rhetoric is by no means unique: many
 other, more notable scholars have made similar arguments in many disciplines. Within
 composition studies, Patricia Bizzell, for instance, endorses an affective scholarly
 methodology. Using Jacqueline Jones Royster's Traces of a Stream as an example,
 Bizzell claims that such an alternative is appropriate not just to feminist research
 methods and discourses but to all scholarly work in rhetoric and composition. An-
 drea Lunsford's "Rhetoric, Feminism, and the Politics of Textual Ownership" simi-
 larly implores feminists to "create, enact, and promote alternative forms of agency"
 (53 5). Likewise, feminist scholar and editor Lynn Worsham, in her explorations of
 the role of l'ecriturefeminine in composition studies and in her call for compositionists
 to construct a "rhetoric of theory," considers the need for more affective, material
 professional discourse(s) and method(s). Worsham explains that not just social space
 and knowledge fields but even "what we take to be the most private and personal of
 phenomena-emotion and the body-are effects of social organization and are made
 available for public administration through the techniques of discipline"; thus, she
 continues, in order "to understand the discipline that has evolved to study and teach
 writing, we must understand the way it works at both the semantic and affective
 levels to produce and organize knowledge and experience" ("On the Rhetoric of
 Theory" 397).
 It would seem to go without saying that these calls for and responses to an ever-
 growing expansion in the conventions of the academic essay-in professionals' criti-
 cal literacy-require similar expansion in the conventions for scholarly consumption
 of academic texts. But say it I must, for despite the discipline's growing acceptance
 of such alternative discourse(s), many if not most academic readers remain commit-
 ted to conventional professional practices of reading. Historically, scholars have sub-
 mitted to the discipline's view of the self and affect as unauthorized subjects; we've
 been trained to see authors' revelations of their personal stories or emotions as self-
 indulgent at worst, irrelevant at best. Thus, many scholars object-sometimes strenu-
 ously-to proposals that academics use "the personal"-an individual's affect and/or
 narrative and/or experience-as a way to renounce mastery and share a common
 discourse.
 Consider, for instance, former CCC editorJoseph Harris's contribution to Pub-
 lishing in Rhetoric and Composition, a collection that J. Hillis Miller calls "the best
 book I know on how to publish scholarship in rhetoric and composition" (xi) and
 whose jacket promises essays from "contributors [who] are current or past editors of
 the discipline's most prestigious scholarly journals [and who] undoubtedly have their
 finger on the pulse of composition's most current scholarship." In his chapter "Per-
 son, Position, Style," Harris distinguishes among "three competing aspects of the
 personal"; he particularly disparages the aspect identified as personal "content,"
 namely "the relaying of autobiographical information about the person writing" (48),
 claiming that we should "raise some questions about the rumored subversive effects
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 of autobiography" at least in part because "most uses of autobiography in scholarly
 work are in fact quite predictable" (50). Also questionable, he says, is Richard Miller's
 belief that the reason scholars react "nervously" to an autobiographical move is that
 it requires them to respond to an author's presence rather than an author's mastery.
 Harris declares that there's "an economic as well as psychological aspect" (51) to
 scholars' nervous response and concludes that "there seems something peculiar about
 downplaying a sense of'mastery' through calling attention to one's self" (52).
 As you have perhaps already predicted, this dissonance between current calls
 for a more material, affective discourse and a competing commitment to conven-
 tional reading habits presents a crucial ethical dilemma in our professional discur-
 sive practice: we argue for innovations in our professional writing but remain faithful
 to conventional logics, gestures, and epistemologies in our reading. In Ethical Di-
 lemmas in Feminist Research Gesa Kirsch helps us recognize some consequences of
 this ethical dilemma when she explains that "those interested in ethical inquiry must
 realize that our task is not simply to do research and to publish it, but also to culti-
 vate audiences that can be moved to action by it" (100). Nonetheless, in further
 considering the politics of publication, she retracts what she calls her earlier "enthu-
 siasm for new textual practices in composition" and says this: "I want to step back
 and scrutinize my enthusiasm, to articulate some of my reservations [such as] the
 matter of readability, and the questions of access and utility that attend any act of
 rhetorical innovation" (69). Feminists' new textual practices, Kirsch concludes, in-
 volve "demanding, time-consuming tasks which ask readers to carry out much of the
 interpretive and analytical work usually done by authors [...]. This is an unusually
 hard burden for readers to bear, one for which readers expect a significant reward"
 (72).
 That certainly seems true. And it's likewise true that some authors use "the
 personal" to reveal intimate details of their lives not readily or even tangentially
 relevant to professional work; to be cloyingly flip or trendy or hip; to satisfy their
 longing to write creative nonfiction without much academic purpose. Who can re-
 ally blame readers for being nervous about or disappointed in such writing? I too
 found it "peculiar" if and when authors submitting pieces for this special issue ig-
 nored the needs of College English readers.
 But the rhetoric that Kirsch uses-"readers expect a significant reward"-gives
 me pause. When Kirsch analyzes readers' needs in economic terms and assumes this
 economy to be-if not natural-at least beyond reproach, she disempowers feminist
 authors by charging them with the full burden of "greater interpretive responsibil-
 ity" for their construction of texts that challenge traditional publication practices
 (66). In this analysis, Kirsch aligns herself-probably unwittingly-with the same
 economy of textual consumption that Harris advocates when he claims that "the
 briskness, clarity, and self-effacement of classic academic prose can be seen not sim-
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 ply as a surrender to the logic of patriarchy but also as a kind of deference, as a desire
 not to impose too much on one's readers" (51). In his view, it's not surprising-
 certainly not unethical-if academic readers angrily reject the efforts of an author
 who "flouts this customary deference and asks the audience instead to attend to his
 own feelings or experiences," for "it is the reader who has usually paid to attend an
 academic conference or subscribe to a journal" or-in the currency of sweat eq-
 uity-to review a manuscript (51). Harris concludes that "there is an economic as
 well as psychological aspect to this discomfort and anger-that one wants to get
 what one has paid for" (51).
 I read Harris's conclusion as a skewed, narrow, and patrician view of what our
 textual economy should be. For one, it fails to consider that not just the reader(s) but
 also the speakers/authors have paid to attend the conference or write for the journal.
 (Indeed those roles are often filled by the very same individuals.) Second, it assumes
 that how Harris wants to spend his money is how we all do. Most important, it
 projects an institutionalized, and therefore most certainly masculinist, ethics and
 epistemology. Such androcentrism misrecognizes its demand for a feminist author's
 deference to the authority of an academic reader unwilling to be held accountable
 for the interpretive authority constructed by his professional practices.
 If we want to commit to a literacy that ends oppression, then perhaps we should
 be willing to extend ourselves enough to shop more wisely. Perhaps we need to look
 carefully at our procedures of discourse, the economy driving our discursive prac-
 tices. Foucault has carefully demonstrated the ways that the author-function "re-
 sults from a complex operation whose purpose is to construct the rational entity we
 call an author" and that what we designate as characteristics of the author "are pro-
 jections, in terms always more or less psychological, of our way of handling the
 texts: in the comparisons we make, the traits we extract as pertinent, the continuities
 we assign, or the exclusions we practice" (127). I'd say that expecting "customary
 deference" is one such practice. What I'm asking us to do instead is to recognize
 that accountability for discursive practices comprises an academic professional's ethical
 and interpretive responsibility. This responsibility is not just to feminist theory and
 method, but to any system grounded in equitable, open-minded exchange.
 Here, then, is my first move toward a discursive ethics of professional critical
 literacy, namely the recognition that our textual economy-the procedures that de-
 termine our discursive practices as academics-includes consumption as well as pro-
 duction of our professional texts. At this point in our revisionary view of professional
 discourse, I want us to consider the ethical dimensions of the economy we're en-
 dorsing, particularly the payoffs we expect as well as the assumption that our expec-
 tations are (or even should be) similar. (I readily include myself in this "we," since,
 until now, my scholarly contributions have been most focused on how to write, on
 how to produce, an embodied rhetoric rather than on how to read it.) We as a pro-
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 fession have not yet paid enough attention to our practices of consuming the alterna-
 tive discourse(s) that we too-not just our students-produce; as a result, our prac-
 tices undermine, if not censure, innovative textual production, disciplining their
 subversive potential.
 Lunsford and Ede note this phenomenon in their "Writing Back" response to
 the "Exploring Discontinuities" section of Feminism and Composition Studies:
 What significance (if any) should we (or other readers) attach to the fact that your
 essays tend to accept and embody, rather than to transgress, the conventions of tradi-
 tional academic prose? Does this acceptance and embodiment mark a place of para-
 dox and difficulty or does it represent a judicious response to your specific rhetorical
 situations [.. .]? (318)
 The significance I can attach to the phenomenon Lunsford and Ede note is this: if
 we want to support not just theories but practices that challenge traditional aca-
 demic prose, then we need to address the ethical imperative for a professional criti-
 cal literacy that demands that readers, as well as writers, be accountable for the
 "interpretive burden." Readers must be willing to bear the discomfort involved in
 avoiding what Royster, in "When the First Voice You Hear Is Not Your Own,"
 refers to as the bad manners of trespassing in Others' territories, speaking over Other
 voices. Evidence of discursive bad manners would be practices that perpetuate read-
 ers' misrecognizing their emotional responses to the theory/opinion they encoun-
 ter, their positions of professional privilege and power over Others, and their habitual
 practice-often invisible-of particular choices as interpreters and thus of particu-
 lar methods of judging and interpreting epistemologies.
 One configuration of a more ethical literacy is what Min-Zhan Lu has called
 "critical affirmation." "At the heart of critical affirmation," Lu explains, is "the ten-
 sion between individual agency and collective goals of ending oppression" (189).
 The practice relies on "mark[ing] writing, especially personal narratives, as a site for
 reflecting on and revising one's sense of self, one's relations with others, and the
 conditions of one's life" (173).
 Obviously, I endorse such a literacy, for it entails directing one's privilege and
 individual autonomy toward a utopian goal of illuminating rather than masking the
 oppressive cultural forces inherent in institutional discourse(s). To me, supporting
 the goal itself constitutes my "reward" for the nervousness, impatience, and other
 discomfort that come with the burden of developing and learning the new interpre-
 tive practices necessary to consuming new textual forms.
 Such a goal demands what I call a "discursive ethics" of professional reading
 practices. This ethics is committed to confronting masculinist and racist privilege,
 to promoting what Royster identifies as "codes of behavior that can sustain more
 concretely notions of honor, respect, and good manners across boundaries" ("When"
 33). In order to enact a discursive ethics, academic professionals must attend to all
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 aspects of their experience (thoughts, feelings, memories, or associations) when they
 grade, review, or otherwise consume texts. In other words, readers must learn to
 embody their responses as individuals and as professionals. Such embodied reading
 demands recognizing and being accountable for our often invisible commitment to
 the professional practice of a particular choice as interpreters and to the oppressive
 potential that choice has on writers of difference.
 This brings me to my second important move toward revising our conven-
 tional textual economy, namely offering a few suggestions for developing embodied
 professional reading practices that sanction a critical, self-reflective awareness of the
 emotional and ideological origins of our textual interpretations. Though my sug-
 gestions are rooted in Royster's and Krista Ratcliffe's outlines for better listening
 practices, they are also in large part cut from the same cloth as the "recovery writ-
 ing" I've earlier proposed ("Making Writing Matter"). The fact that my proposals
 for embodied, ethical reading and writing practices differ little signals the strength
 of the textual economy they construct: interpretive responsibility is shared and thus
 insists on collaboration, relationship, between readers and writers.
 Not surprisingly, then, one essential of an ethical professional critical literacy
 would be a willingness to read and respond in order to empower, rather than have
 power over, the writer. This willingness is crucial, "for embodied writing and read-
 ing require me to surrender my analytical need to be right and/or absolute in my
 understanding of how language [and life] works" ("Making" 101). That surrender
 reveals the need for another logic, one not based on noncontradiction or supremacy,
 and a reconception of our purpose as professional readers. In the role of negotiator,
 Royster tells us, we need to determine our "rhetorical purpose to be to cross, or at
 least to straddle boundaries with the intent of shedding light" ("When" 34); thus, a
 discursive ethic demands-especially when we're responding to an author of
 discourse(s) and/or experience(s) opposing our own or invoking intense affect-that
 we be "curious enough to try to understand [his or her] voice" ("When" 36).
 Royster pointedly asks us, "How do we demonstrate that we honor and respect
 the person talking and what the person is saying?" (38). I see an answer in Ratcliffe's
 "Rhetorical Listening" and its conception of a new logic of understanding. Unlike
 the divided logos of traditional "disciplinary and cultural biases [, ...] the logos that
 speaks but does not listen," Ratcliffe tells us, a more feminist conception of logos is
 "based on a desire for an intersubjective receptivity, not mastery, and on a simultaneous
 recognition of similarities and differences, not merely one or the other" (202, 205).
 In addition to feminist reading practices that seek to empower authors, another
 crucial element of embodied reading is relentless self-reflection; the self-reflexivity
 of an ethical textual economy demands that I continually call attention to the ways I
 use rhetoric to position myself in relation to texts and authors and to the motives I
 have for doing so.
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 To give you an example of this relentless self-reflection, let me refer to my
 earlier discussion of Gesa Kirsch's Ethical Dilemmas and contextualize my interpre-
 tation. I read that volume as a book reviewer for JAC. I've since used it more than
 once as a text for graduate methodology as well as feminist theory courses. Clearly,
 then, and as I declared in the review, I found it a good book, useful. And yet, as a
 professional reviewer, I felt compelled to find something in the book to disagree
 with; otherwise, I'd appear too agreeable and compliant, incapable of making "new
 knowledge" in the field. And indeed I did find such a thing: I pointed out in my
 review-as I have here-what I see as Kirsch's failure to hold readers as well as
 writers accountable for their discursive practices. As I write (and you read) at this
 very moment, I'm cashing in, so to speak, on Kirsch's "flaw" when I-again-use it
 as a focus for my own argument. Nonetheless, when I foreground-as I am doing
 now-my awareness of the rhetorical move I'm using to position myself as some-
 how more masterful than Kirsch on this topic, as an "expert" authorized to speak in
 the name of the profession, I am in some small way transforming that professional
 practice by drawing attention to it. Hoping to authorize a feminist ethics of profes-
 sional discourse, I am embodying my reading (and writing) practices.
 As you can see, an embodied, ethical reading demands self-reflexivity. But there's
 more: it also requires relentless awareness of emotional responses to texts; in fact,
 my own process often begins in affect. Nevertheless, and exactly like the practices
 I've already identified as the responsibility of authors of embodied writing, an em-
 bodied reading-if it is to be ethical-"transforms my immediate self-absorption
 with subjective affect into an awareness of not only how my responses have been
 socially conditioned and socially perceived, but also how I as author [or reader] can
 intervene in that conditioning" ("Making" 103). Thus, while embodied reading "re-
 lies on visceral reactions as the point of departure for examining and revising per-
 sonal and social practices," the accountability I'm advocating also insists that I "read
 through" these emotional reactions "in order to recognize how they have been formed
 [.. .] to gain awareness of my individual chain of associations as well as the social
 sites informing those responses" (103).
 In order to examine the stakes of my subjective response, I must recognize how
 the passages that evoked my anger, longing, or "victory" affect my view of myself as
 a professional, how they might threaten or impede me in my goals of success and
 self-satisfaction. "Most importantly, taking inventory of my affective responses re-
 quires me to scrutinize the fears that belie my vehement insistence [ . .] that my
 position is uniquely righteous, factual, exact, superior" ("Making" 103). I might ask
 myself, what commitment(s) to a practice of a particular interpretive choice do I
 have and how does this author I'm reading invoke that commitment?
 Let me consider my earlier reading of Harris as another example. Right up
 front, I need to admit that the first time I read "Person, Position, Style"-in particu-
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 lar the section on person-I was more than a little peeved. I'll share only three of my
 visceral reactions: "Bull ! Sexist, myopic crap!" I scribbled next to Harris's claim
 that the classic style of academic prose "can be seen not simply as a surrender to the
 logic of patriarchy but also as a kind of deference, as a desire not to impose too much
 on one's readers" (51); "Yeah, but you're not the only paying customer!" I responded
 to his claim that "one wants to get what one has paid for" (51); near the conclusion,
 I fairly shouted, "You assume that the 'job to be done' is the one you see, you want to
 be done, the one you want to invest in. What about the rest of us?" As you can
 probably see, I was reacting to what I read as Harris's attitude (whatever that means),
 his persona; it seemed so "typically" masculine, one voice assuming authority for
 everyone.
 Now I am quite sure that I'm not the first to get royally ticked off reading
 academics' work, not alone in my practice of vehemently retorting to others in the
 margins of my books; I'd say that practice is probably more or less typical. So please
 consider the possibility, then, that I'm not "confessing" my responses to you because
 I see myself as guilty or unique. What I mean to do is "read through" my bodily
 reactions, which clearly position me as feminist, as resistant to traditional authority,
 maybe as insubordinate or reactionary; perhaps I even seem as guilty of myopic self-
 centeredness as the writer I'm castigating. I can trace-and have traced (see "Autho-
 rizing Anger")-my own private chain of associations and discovered the familial
 roots of my resistance to patriarchal authority and my penchant for feminist reading
 practices. In this context, however, I choose to focus on the social, professional sites
 of my consumption and reproduction of Harris's article.
 This is the third (or is it the fourth?) time that I-as a feminist arguingfor
 personal criticism-have contested in print Harris's "person" claims in that article.
 Apparently, I feel compelled to prove him wrong. Fortunately for me, then, the
 conventions of academic discourse sanction (I could even say "require") my gesture
 toward another author's "flaw" and my subsequent correction of it. Being disci-
 plined to rely on such gestures so that my own academic prose will be published and
 my profession(al position) secure, I've learned a composing process whose invention
 comes about by constructing others' fault(s). Thus, I made a valuable discovery when
 I first read that article, or perhaps it's more accurate to say that I've mastered it,
 made it valuable (to me) by reading it the way I have. In fact, it might even be fair to
 say that I've been self-indulgent in insisting on the article's relevance so many times,
 that my first or even second challenge was okay but thereafter I've been beating that
 proverbial horse. Though I could, perhaps, have justified my insistent critique of
 Harris's view of personal writing by referring to its inclusion in a volume intended
 to shape novice professionals' writing styles and/or to his power to shape the
 discipline's discourse when he served as editor of CCC, I think it a safe bet that the
 "briskness, clarity, and self-effacement of classic academic prose" have-up till now-
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 justified if not masked my indulgence. But now that I am pointing it out to you, now
 that I am considering my own accountability in critiquing Harris's piece, am I acting
 more or less self-indulgently? Am I renouncing mastery or claiming it? Is it me or is
 it us, our practice, that I am asking you to scrutinize here? Is posing these questions
 in either/or terms even relevant or useful to my goal of ending oppression in profes-
 sional discourses?
 And speaking of scrutinizing, I need to acknowledge that writing this particular
 critique of Harris's chapter sent me back to his text in order to better contextualize
 my earlier objections. I (re)discovered that after his discussion of "person," in his
 next section, entitled "Position," he presents several examples of what he considers
 appropriately personal academic writing. "What all this work shares," he says, "is a
 kind of disciplined subjectivity, a willingness to acknowledge one's own position
 within the profession and culture as a driving force behind (and also a limit on) what
 one has to argue" (55). Hmm, that sounds pretty reasonable to me; in fact, it could
 even describe what I'm doing here. So could Harris's earlier reference to Clifford
 Geertz's belief that "writers can make themselves present in their texts not only
 through autobiography but also through trying to state what draws them to the
 subject or issue at hand [. ..] what they see as being at stake for both themselves and
 others in that discussion" (52). He and I are more of the same mind than I had
 thought. Perhaps we part ways only because I can't buy into his insistence that per-
 son, position, and style are competing aspects of the personal; his belief that a writer's
 relaying personal information about himself or herself-the use of autobiography-
 is confessional and therefore inappropriate in academic arenas; nor finally his con-
 viction that most scholarly uses of autobiography are predictable. I hope the pieces
 included in this special issue prove me reliable.
 But I do have to admit that there's no logical reason that I'm right and he's not,
 no foundation preventing Harris from offering the same critique of my position that
 I've presented (ad infinitum) of his. After all, why should I have any more authority
 than he does to determine what counts as getting "what one has paid for"? What
 gives me a corner on the ethics market? And if we want to compare attitudes-well,
 mine tends to be pretty flippant, less prudent. If I commit to the discursive ethics
 I've been advocating here, then I need to own up to not seeing much-if any-
 rational difference between Harris's argument and my critique of it. Rhetorically,
 however, I do see important differences, for I have at least tried to gesture to the
 personal stakes and affect motivating my critique. It's not much, perhaps, but it's
 something that decenters the logic of patriarchy. I have tried to convince you that
 we should all commit to a certain discursive ethics; however, I haven't (totally) ob-
 scured my personal motives or myself by using "one" instead of "I," by masking my
 preference for a certain type of personal writing in an attempt to legislate all types.
 This focus on rhetoricity is as crucial to embodied reading as it is to embodied
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 writing. Combined, the two provide a discursive ethics of professional critical lit-
 eracy that empower the goals, politics, and textual economy of difference. As I've
 said of embodied writing, ethical professional reading requires me to engage rather
 than ignore problems of interpretation and meaning. It
 grants me powers of analysis while pressing me to reflect on how my knowledge,
 affect, and taste are produced by the specific social locations which define me [...].
 The discursive tools of recovery writing [and of ethical reading are] crucial to recog-
 nizing myself personally and professionally as part of a larger social network, as well
 as (or sometimes rather than) an individual target of an individual enemy. Embodied
 writing [and reading have] helped me see that it is in the gaps of the contradictory
 positions and emotions where I can learn the most, [for] it is in the interplay of my
 attempts to mediate those contradictions that I can best become aware of those some-
 times invisible ideologies that discipline me and those social institutions which con-
 struct me. ("Making" 105-06)
 I'm sure that I am not alone in my yearning to answer Royster's incisive call for
 us to "construct paradigms that permit us to engage in better practices in cross-
 boundary discourse, whether we are teaching, researching, writing, or talking with
 Others, whoever those Others happen to be" ("When the First Voice" 37-38). Since
 our reading(s) of their texts is clearly a means of "talking with Others," I ask us to
 acknowledge the ramifications of our practices as textual consumers, to be account-
 able to people as well as ideas and to one another as much as if not more than to an
 abstract "body of knowledge." A discursive ethics that requires me to evoke my
 beliefs at their most invisible embodied place, to scrutinize relentlessly the stakes in
 maintaining those individual beliefs and confront the privileges they afford me, and
 to stage self-consciously my methods for persuading you of the authority of those
 beliefs-that kind of reading and interpreting will contribute, I believe, to an economy
 of discourse that is ethical. In that economy, readers' and writers' "significant re-
 ward" could be just what Royster envisioned: "[D]iscourse invigorated with mul-
 tiple perspectives, [ . .] policies and practices well-tuned toward a clear respect for
 human potential and achievement [ ...] and a clearer understanding that voicing at
 its best is not just well-spoken but also well-heard" (40). To me that seems like get-
 ting my money's worth. Here's hoping you, too, get your reward-or at least don't
 feel cheated-as you read the embodied writing that follows.
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